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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: FURTHER MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 15 December 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/116 O, paragraphs 8 and 9 of which read as follows:

> "The General Assembly,
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> "...
>
> "8. Also requests the Secretary-General to report by 1992, and every three years thereafter until the fourth Review Conference is convened, on technological developments relevant to the Treaty and to the verification of compliance with the Treaty, including dual-purpose technologies for peaceful and specified military ends; in carrying out this task he should draw from official sources and from contributions by States parties to the Treaty and may use the assistance of appropriate expertise;
>
> "9. Urges all States parties to the Treaty to assist the Secretary-General accordingly by providing information and drawing his attention to suitable sources".

2. Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 27 February 1992, requested all States parties to submit the relevant information by 30 April 1992. Accordingly, the Secretary-General submits herewith the information received thus far, namely, from Finland, Panama and Ukraine. Other replies on this item will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[20 December 1989]

1. With reference to article VII of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, under which all States parties to the Treaty are urged to assist the Secretary-General by providing information on technological developments relevant to the Treaty, Finland wishes to provide the following information concerning recent technological developments relevant to the Treaty that have taken place in Finland.

2. A manned deep-sea research vehicle has been developed and produced in Finland, which has thus become one of the few countries with advanced deep-sea research technology.

3. In the spring of 1985, the Finnish company Rauma-Repola Oy was awarded a contract by the Soviet trade organization, V/O Sudoimport, for the design and construction of a 6,000-metre three-man submersible. The contract was later expanded to include another submersible of the same type.

4. On 13 December 1987, the first submersible was dived to 6,170 m (20,238 ft). The next day, the second submersible was dived to 6,120 m (20,075 ft).

5. When developing the deep-sea research vehicle, attention was directed mainly to the following areas:

(a) Light and compact overall construction with a very low drag;

(b) Ultra-high strength steel for the personnel sphere and ballast tanks;

(c) Sea-water variable ballast trim system;

(d) Light buoyance material;

(e) Small DC/AC inverter systems;

(f) Navigation and obstacle avoidance systems;

(g) Data acquisition system.

In most of the above-mentioned areas a pioneering approach was used to develop the most effective solution for these vehicles.

6. The main data of the submersibles are:

Operational depth	6,000 m
Length, overall	7.8 m
Beam, overall	3.8 m
Beam, thrusters removed	2.9 m
Height with sail in	3.25 m
Weight	18,700 kg
Speed	5.0 knots
Max payload	300 kg
Energy capacity	Approx. 100 kWh
Personnel	1 pilot + 2 scientists
Life support	246 man-hours

In addition, various pieces of scientific equipment have been taken into account when designing the vehicles.

7. Rauma-Repola is marketing the above-mentioned deep-sea research vehicle, called RRSUB 6000, on a commercial basis. Advanced deep-sea research technology developed in Finland is thus available to anyone interested. Technical information concerning the submersibles is in the public domain.

8. It should be underlined that the experience concerning the use of the RRSUB 6000, designed for scientific activities, has been favourable. The vehicle could, in some circumstances, also be suitable for purposes of verification of the Sea-Bed Treaty.

9. Encouraged by the constructive spirit that prevailed in the Third Review Conference, Finland looks forward to further communications from the parties of the Sea-Bed Treaty regarding technological developments relevant to the Treaty, believing that such information will be helpful in the preparation of the report requested by the Third Review Conference.

[Original: English]

[7 May 1992]

Referring to its previous reply, dated 20 December 1989, the Government of Finland would like to inform the Secretary-General that since then there have not been any significant technological developments in Finland relevant to the Treaty.

PANAMA

[Original: Spanish]

[29 May 1992]

1. In accordance with the provisions adopted by the Conference on Disarmament, of which Panama is a member, appropriate measures have been taken to fulfil Panama's general obligations with regard to the prohibition of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction that may pose a threat to the environment.

2. In that connection it can be stated that the Republic of Panama has no institutions, facilities, equipment, matériel, laboratories or depots for the production or storage of chemical weapons or of injurious or deadly substances, munitions or devices which employ toxic agents, or which are intended for use in the maintenance of domestic order or the repression of disturbances. Neither are any military tests carried out relating to the use of such devices.

UKRAINE

[Original: Russian]

[22 May 1992]

1. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof occupies an important place in the system of international legal instruments designed to halt the arms race and strengthen peace and international security. Since the Treaty has been in force, there has not been a single case of its violation, no doubts have been expressed regarding the possibility of such violations, and it has not been necessary to make use of the procedures for verification of compliance with its provisions. This demonstrates that the Treaty has been highly effective.

2. Ukraine believes that the Treaty is an effective obstacle to the possible militarization of the seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. It could be followed by other, more far-reaching agreements. Ukraine is not only complying with the provisions of the Treaty, but is also refraining from establishing military bases, structures, installations and other military facilities on the seabed. Consequently, it is not developing technical means of carrying out such activities.

3. Ukraine does not deploy and does not intend to deploy weapons of mass destruction on the floor of its territorial or internal waters or in the subsoil thereof and believes that it would be useful to expand the scope of the Treaty to cover the territorial and internal waters of States parties. Naturally, in order to implement these measures, and the prohibition on establishing any military structures on the seabed, it will be necessary to work out appropriate verification procedures, without which effective compliance with these measures could be called into question.

4. In the view of Ukraine, verification that such structures are not being emplaced on the seabed and ocean floor could be accomplished both by technical means and by providing access to representatives of other States parties, on the basis of reciprocity, to installations and structures on the seabed and ocean floor.

5. In this connection, Ukraine believes that consideration should be given to the proposal to establish a special group of experts which would analyse information on new technical developments relating to the Treaty. Questions of verification of compliance with the Treaty could be considered, if necessary, by this group.